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Economic stability, sound macroeconomic policies, and appro-
priate microeconomic incentives hold down a country'sexternal
debt burden.  Most of the Asian countries pursued prudent
macroeconomic policies, paid attention to price stability, and
minimized  price  distortions.  These  countries  avoided  the
overvalued exchange rates and uncompetitive interest rates that
caused massive capital flight from Latin American and some
African countries.
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INRODUCTION
In the development  economics literature, there is a genzral consensus that the less developed countries
will normally incur current account dericits and rcmain structural capital importers until they emerge from
underdevelopm.-nt. It is also true that the bulk of the financing  of these deficits  would be provided by net capital
inflows  that give rise to external indebtedness. After all, that is how most of the developed countries of today
achieved their growth.  So, there is nothing intrinsically  wrong with external borrowing per se.  The crucial
question is how  best should developing  countries manage external debt without  plunging themselves  into a crisis. 2
This is by no means an easy task as it involves  some important trade-offs that balance the positive effect of
external borrowing  with  its adverse affect on debt accumulation. The link between borrowing  and growth is quite
complex  On the one hand, external financing  enables the borrowing  country to achieve  higher levels  of imports
and investment than can be warranted by domestic  savings  alone. On the other hand, to be able to fully  service
the debt when it falls due, the borrowing countries should have generated reasonably high growth and in turn
trade and saving  surpluses. If this link between higher levels  of imports and investment does not transmit itself
into high growth in income and exports then the borrowing countries face serious difficulties. Most of the
academic and popular discussion  in recent years has exclusively  focussed on the origin and factors contributing
to the debt crisis, the behavior and responses of highly indebted countries in Latin America and Africa, the
bargaining between these countries and  their creditors and  the impact of debt  overhang on the  economic
conditions of these countries.  Very little has been said about the 60 countries or so that were able to avoid
plunging into this crisis and able to strike the trade-offs required.  This paper attempts to fill this gap in the
literature and reviews  the experience  of external debt management of Asian developing  countries during the past
twenly years, compares this with the highly indebted countries and draws some lessons for  enhancing our
understanding of the management of external debt. 3
As the region contains a variety  of countries with different characteristics, endowments, and economic
structures, it is useful to provide a typology  of Asian developing  countries on the basis of their income and debt
burden.
The World Bank classifies countries in three categories: high income (more than $6,000 per capita
income), middle income ($581  - $5,999)  and low income (less than $580). Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan
1  The author is Chief, Debt and Intemational Finance  Division, World Bank. The views expressed  in this paper  are those  of the
author's and  should  not be attributed to the World Bank, its Board  of Directors, its management  or any of its member  countries. The author
has drawn freely from a number of intemal Bank studies  in the preparation  of this paper  and he wishes  to thank Mr.  Ning Zhu for his
assistance  in preparing  the statistical  tables.
2For a survey  of the literature  on the relationship between external debt and growth in developing countries, see  McDonald,
D.C. (1982), 'Debt  capacity and Developing Country  Borrowing,'  sIF  Staff Papers 29 (4).
31he other study which attempts to make a comparative analysis  of extemal debt and macroeconomic  performance is Jeffrey
Sachs, External Debt and Macroeconomic performance in Latin America and East Asia,' Brookings Paper on Economic Activity 2.
(1985). That  study covered six Latin Amencan and four East Asian countries and was limited  up to the period 1983. The analysis  was
a very useful exposition of the political economy of Expon-led and Import-substitution strategies and an cxplanation of the differing
exchange  and trade regimes in Latin  Amenca and Asia2
income), middle income ($581 - $5,999)  and low income (less than $580). Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan
fall in the high income country  and are excluded  from the 'developing  country' group as the term is applied 3nly
to low and middle income countries.
This paper focusses on four sub-groups of Asian developing countries: (a) the ASEAN-4(lndonesia,
Malaysia,  Philippines  and Thailand); (b) South Asia (c) China and (d) Korea.  The ASEAN-4 and Korea are
middle income countries while South Asia and China belong to the low income category.
The data for Asia shown in this paper therefore refer to this sample of ten countries, which accounts
for 98% of the GNP and 97% of total debt, and 94% of the popullation  of the region.Lack of reliable data on
Afghanistan,  Myanmar,  Kampuchea,  Lao P.D.R.,and Vietnam forced the exclusion  of these countries from the
present study. Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives  and the Pacific  Island economies are relatively  free from pressures of
a debt burden and have also been excluded.
An objective measurement  of the severity  of debt burden when applied to developing  countries in Asia,
indicates that the Philippines  and Myanmar are the only two countries in Asia which  are severely  indebted (out
of 46 developing  countries) while Indonesia, Bangladesh,  Sri Lanka and Pakistan are moderately  indebted  4.
How has the debt burden evolved  in the Asian countries in comparison with that of Latin America?
The total external debt of these ten Asian countries in 1990  was $307 billion.  India and Indonesia were the
largest debtors owing debt in excess of $50 billion each, followed by China, the Philippines, Thailand and
Pakistan.  Debt service ratios of only three countries--Indonesia,  India and Philippines--exceeded  30 percent.
Latin American debt outstanding in 1990  was $429 billion. Brazil, Mexico,  Argentina and Venezuela were the
largest debtors and twelve  out of twenty  severely  indebted middle income countries belonged to this region.
It is interesting to note that the average annual growth rate in debt of East Asian countries during the
sub-periods 1973-80  and 1980-87  has been higher than that of Latin America (see Table 1).  Despite the more
rapid accumulation  of debt, all other key debt indicators  except  Debt/GNP remained stable or declined for Asia,
while those in Latin America worserted  despite repeated reschedulings  and arrears accumulation (see Table 2).
The improved  debt indicators  of Asia in fact  reflect the underlying  strong economic  performance of the countries
in this region.
How has the economic performance of the two groups of countries varied?  Table 3 presents the
comparative picture  for  three  sub-periods 1965-73, 1973-80,  and  1980-87.  The first sub-period which is
rhrarntpri7PA  hv  qtpssdv  snd stable economic conditions showq thst  th  1  diffprinrq-e  in  thb  nerfennA  nee  of  the  two
groups were not that large. The second sub-period  captures the effects of the exogenous  shocks  and turbulence
suffered by the  developing countries, while the  third  sub-period depicts the  differentiated response and
adjustment to these shocks. In the 1980s,  Asian incomes  grew more than twice  as fast as in the rest of the world,
and exports expanded at about twice the rate of North America and Europe.
Management of external debt can be influenced  by the international economic environment,  domestic
economic policies and portfolio management decisions. It would  be useful to recapitulate, as a backdrop, the
intemational economic enviroinment  in which the developing  countries had to manage their external debt.
4World Debt Tables 1989-90presents  the classification  of the countries  and the definitions of the severe and moderate
indebtedness. Severely indebted countries  are defined as countries in which  three of the four key ratios are above critical levels:  debt
to GNP (50 percent), debt to exports of goods and services  (275 perccnt) scheduled  debt service  to exports (30 percent) and accrued
interest to exports (20 percent).3
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIIC  FNVIRONMENT
D;1ring the decades  of the  1970s and  1980s, four features  of  the international  economic  environment
particularly  affected  the development  performance  of developing  countries.
The first of these was relatively slow growth in industrialized  countries.  The annual growth  of real GDP
of OECD  countries  slowed down considerably  from 4.1 percent  in the  1960s to 2.5 percent  in the  1970s.  The
recovery that  was expected for the  1980s failed to materialize.
Second, the  prices of primary commodities  fell sharply; nominal prices  were highly volatile during  the
two decades.  Real interest  rates are believed to be inversely correlated  with prices of non-fuel commodities,  and
real interest  rates, particularly  in the 1980s, were relatively high compared  to the  earlier  decades.
Third, the  movement  toward  free-trade  policies, sustained  since the late  1940s by successive rounds  of
tariff reductions  under  'he  auspices of the General  Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade,  came under  serious threat
in the mid-1970s.  Successive adjustments  in the  Multi-Fibre  Arrangement,  and  the proliferation  of voluntary
export  restraints  and  non-tariff  barriers,  affected  a  growing proportion  of  the  trade  in  manufactured  goods
between  OECD  and  developing  countries.  In agricultural  trade,  already  heavily protected,  barriers  in OECD
countries  became  even more onerous  durinm the  1980s.
Fourth,  the  breakdown  of the  Bretton  Woods  system of fixed exchange rates  in the  early  1970s made
macroeconomic  management  much more complex than before for developing countries, which now had  to adapt
to sharp  fluctuations  in exchange rates  among  major  currencies.
For all these reasons,  the global context during  the 1970s and  1980s was in sharp contrast  to that of the
previous 20 year.  B3ut  a distinction  has also to be drawn between  the  1970s  and  the  1980s. The  1970s  witnessed
oil price hikes, with their profound  repercussions  throughout  the world.  Efforts were made to finance the much-
enlarged balance of payments cdeficits  of oil-importing developing countries including two oil facilities at the IMF.
Private  commercial bank  lending to ceveloping countries  expanded phenomenally.  In addition,  there  was a big
increase  in official development  assistance,  partly  from petroleum  exporting  countries.
In many ways the  1980s had quite  a different  character,  The financial and  econoniic turbulence  of the
decade had a pervasive adverse impact on development generally.  For OECD  countries experiencing double-digit
inflation,  containment  of price  levels in the  1980s became  a key aim of economic  oolicv. overridin0 the. eArlier
emphasi.j on maintairang  full employment.  The strict  monetary  policies adopted  by industrial  countries  in the
aftermx h  of the  :.iflationary period  of the late  1970s had  a noticeable  effect on demand  and prices  for primary
commodities  from developing  countries.  Prices  of conmmodities  other  than  fuel fell further;  their  average  level
for the decade was 35 percent  lower than in 1980. Developing countries'  exports of manufactured  goods volume
had  sustained  very rapid growth  of  13.4 percent  a year  in  1974-80, registered  a  major  setback.  Such exports
increased  by only 9.4 percent  a year  during  1981-87.  In  value terms,  the  growth  of  these,  eAn1tz  QlnAxena
more  markedly - trom  14 percent  a  year in the  earlier  period  to only 4.7 percent  a year in  1981-87.
The most  dramatic  feature  of the  international  economic  environment  in the  1980s was of course  the
debt  crisis.  In international  capital markets,  real interest  rates rose to very high levels.  Averaging 5.85 percent
during  1980-89, they were  twice as  high as  in the  1960s, and  nearly  six time as  high as  in  1974-79.  As debt
difficulties  grew,  international  commercial  lenders  stopped  most  voluntary  lending  to  the  highly  indebted
developing  countries.  Gross  commercial  bank  lending  to all developing countries  dropped  from  $52 billion in
1981 to far short of $10billion  a year at the end of the 1980s. The gross flow of private foreign direct investment
to developing countries  peaked  in 1982 and then declined sharply in subsequent  years in contrast  to high growth
recorded  in OECD  countries  throughout  the  decade.  Many developing  countries  that  had  received  large net
resource  transfers  from  abroad  in the  1970s now had  to pay very high proportions  of  their  export earnings  to
service debt.4
The external  circumstances  facing Asian countries  in the  1970s  and  early  1980s were  no different  from
those faced by the  Latin American and  African countries.  Oil price shocks, low cost of funds, falling commodity
prices  and  recession  in the  industrial  countries  stimulated  the demand  for external  borrowing  while the  excess
liquidity of  commercial  banks  pushed  the  supply  of  these  funds.  A proxy  variable  used  for  capturing  the
influence  cl  externai  envirunilnlit  dli  wllAb  vAI  iLlad  I  Th.  0 '  1  4,,-  i  -Sf trade  of
Asian countries  declined  (0.6 percent  per  year) during  1973-82 compared  to an  increase  (3.8 percent)  for the
highly indebted  countries.  The volatility in the  termns-of-trade was, however, considerably  higher  for the  latter
group  of countries.  Sachs 5who estimated  the real income effect of terms-of-trade  change  for the period  1979-85
did not find  any significant differences  between  the  two groups  of countries.  His broad  conclusion  based  on
calculation of combined  effect of the terms-of-trade  and interest  rate shock was that macroeconomic performance
and  the  need  to reschedule  were  not closely tied  to the  mag  niitude of  the  external  shocks as  a proportion  of
GDP.  Donovan's  study6 of  a  larger  sample  of  middle-income  developing  countries  also  found  that  the
magnitude  of  terms-of-trade  movements  was  not  markedly  different  for  groups  of  reschedulers  and  non-
reschedulers.
The main question  explored  in this paper  is: Given the  same international  economic environment  and
no differences  in the  magnitudes  of external shocks, why have the Asian countries  avoided the  debt  crisis while
the Latin American  and African countries have been embroiled in this unfortunate  situation  for almost a decade
now.  It is not proposed  to provide a fully satisfactory or rigorous  answer to this question, but based on a number
of empirical  studies carried out within and outside the Bank some plausible hypotheses  and supporting  evidence
are  presented  to  shed  some  light.  It needs  to be  emphasized  at  the  outset,  that  the  analysis presented  here
should not be interpreted  as if the Asian countries  were above comrmiitting  mistakes or they did everything right
all the  time.  Alternatively,  it would be unfair  to characterize  that the  Latin  Americans  were  never able  to put
their act together  and  kept on repeating  the same errors  of judgement.  It is equally plausible  that the facts and
hypotheses  that guided  their policy decisions  turned out to be quite different  in actual implementation  of these
policies.  The actual  outcomes  examined over an  extended  period  of time tend  t^  mask  the  complex itterplay
of  forces  and  interactions  that  took place  during  the  course  of  events in the  1970s F  d  1980s.  The  analysis
therefore  abstracts from  these complex interactions and presents a relatively simplified picture  of the end results.
DOMESTIC  Pt)LICY  ENVIRONMENT
The differences  in economnic  and  market structure  do persist between  the countries  in the three  regions
and  so do levels of institutional  development.  They may also, in part,  explain  for the  differentiated  economic
performance.  Other variables such as human  resource development  and skill mix of the labor torce  whuch attect
the growth  in a longer time horizon  may also be equally  important.  The  "new"growth  theorists  have provided
evidence that  increasing returns  or positive externalities  from such factors as knowledge  and human  capital can
explain the  divergence  in growth  rates  among  developing  countries.  It is also becoming  clear  that  the impact
on growth of better  economic policies and  more education,  together  is greater  than  the sum of each  separately.
A comparison  of the human  development indicators  of the Asian countries in this sample  with those of the most
severely indebted  countries in Latin America, do not bring out any significant difference  in this aspect (see Table
4).  Eight out of ten  Asian countries  in the sample  are classified as having medium  or low human  development
indices.  On the other  hand, five highly indebted  countries Chile, Costa Rica, Argentina,  Venezuela  and  Mexico
fall under  high human  development class.  Of course, the same indicators  for Sub-Saharan  Africa are quite low.
S  Sachs, ibid.
6Doral  Donovan,  'The  sources  of External  Debt  Difficulties: Some  empirical  evidence.'  tF  Discusaion Memorandum  84/15
(1984).5
The role of the state in Asian countries where partnership  between state and private sector and between
labor  and  capital  has  been  a  distinctive  feature  of their  development  strategy  may also  be  advanced  as  'the
dominant'  factor that  impinges on the performance  of these countries.  Govemnient  intervention  is essential  for
development,  but what  makes the difference  in the outcome  is whether  this intervention  is likely to help  rather
than  hinder  economic growth.  In  East  Asian  countries,  these interventions  were, by and  large,  beneficial  and
conducive ar  A took the  forrn of simple,  transparent  rules  and  policies rather  than  discretionary  controls.  The
complementarity  of a sound policy environment  and market-friendly  interventions is one of the most encouraging
lessons of the development experience  that has been amply documented  in the forthcoming  World Development
Report.  7  The  role of the  State  cannot,  however, be  separated  from  the strategy  and  the  policies they pursue
or  the response  they make to the  external  shocks or the  way the external poitfolio  i  uimuiageu.  Our hypothesis
is that even after  taking account  of the  differences  in the  structure  and  institutions,  the  most dominant  factors
in explaining  Asia's  impressive  growth  performance  in the  1970s and  1980s, have been  the  orientation  of the
development  strategy,  mode  of  adjustment  to  external  shocks,  the  nature  of  macroeconomic  policies,  the
efficiency of investment  and  portfolio  management  and  finally the domestic  saving efforts.
(1)  Outward  Orientation
First, the Asian countries were generally less affected from recession in part due  to the outwsrd-oriented
policies  that they  pursued.  When  the  global recovery began  in  1982, they were  able  to take advantage  of the
rapid  expansion  of  manufactured  goods  exports,  raising  export  earnings  sufficiently rapidly  to  reduce  their
debt/export  ratios and  escape the debt crisis.  By outward  orientation  it is generally meant  a combination  of two
factors:  first, that  the  level of protection,  especially  for inputs  into the  production  process,  was relatively low
(resulting  in a sustainable  level of a real exchange rate favorable to exporters);  and second, that there is relatively
little variability in the real  exchange rates,  so that incentives are  stable  over time.
The  evidence  regarding  the  differences  in econornic  performance  arising  out  of  outward  or  inward
orientation  of the developing economies has recently been presented  in a major study of 95 LDCs for the period
1976-85!  The  study uses  an  index of outward  orientation  on  the  basis of real  exchange  rate  distortion  and
variability.  This measure  was tound to be highly correlated  with per capita  GDP  growth  in this large  sample.
The most open  quantile of countries which included twelve out of sixteen Asian countries had a per capita growth
rate  of 2.9%;  the  next  quantile  which included  the  remaining  four  Asian countries,  0.9%; the  third  quantile,
0.2% and  the most  closed quantile,  1.3%.  These results  strongly imply that trade  liberalization,  devaluation  of
the real exchange rate,  and  maintenan^e  of a 'ompetitive  real exchange rate could dramatically  improve growth
performance  in many poor  countries.  The study estimates  that  the  gains  from  shifting to  an  'Asian  level" of
cutwaid  ouieniation  ai.d  real  exchange  rate  stability  are  increases  of  1.5 percentage  points  per  year  in Latin
America's  per capita  growth and  2.1 percentage  points  per year  in Africa's.  The outward  orientation  of Asian
countries  can be  clearly discerned  by examining  trade  openness  and price  distortion  measures  in Table  5.
Edwards  (1990) has used  a modified  neoclassical  growth  model  to test  the  same proposition.  Using
cross section  data  from  30 coumtries, he  found  strong  support  for the hypotheses  that  there  exists a  negative
aliaiituuship  boiweun the degree of restriction on internationai  trade  and econormc pertormance  In the developing
countries.  After  taking  into  account  the  roles  of  capital  accumulation,  growth  in  the  labor  force  and
technological  gap, countries  with higher  degrees  of  trade  intervention  tend  to grow, on  average,  slower than
7Vorld  Development  Report,  1991 (forthcoming).
SD. Dollar  (1990), 'Outward-oriented Developing  Economies  Really  Do Grow  More  Rapidly:  Evidence  for  95 LDCr,  1976-
85."  Economic  Development and Cultural  Change  (forthcoming).6
countries  with lower trade  restrictions.
There  are  a number  of reasons  why the  difference in orientation  could affect growth, both in the short
and long run.  Outward orientation  generally results in a more rapid growth of exports.  Competition  with foreign
producers  raises efficiency and  there  mav be externalities  associated  with exporting  that  cause open  economies
to grow more rapidly  over long periods  of time.  There  is considerable  evidence  that the  process  of exporting,
combined  with easy availability of imported  inputs and machinery, accelerates technological advance in developing
economies. '°
Outward  orientation  also leads to diversification of imports.  High level of exports create an equally high
level of demand  for imports  of various capital and  intermediate  goods.  At the same time, higher income  leve!s
associated with higher exports induce demand  for additional  consumer goods imports that were either previously
restricted  or  faced stiff tariff barriers.  Under  the  new liberalized  regime,  no single import  item (for example,
oil) constitutes  a large  share  of the total  irnports.  Thus, just  as export  diversification leads to relatively stable
export  price index so does import  diversification  impart  sonie stability to the aggregate  import  price  index.
Outward  orientation  therefore  makes  it  possible  to  use  external  capital  for  development,  without
encountering  serious  problems  in  servicing  the  corresponding  debt.  Inward  orientation  of  production  is
considered  one of the  reasons  why Latin  American  and African economies  have experienced  "debt crises'  that
have inhibited growth  in the  1980ss
(2)  Adjustment  to External  Shocks
Second, the successful countries treated  adverse exogenous shocks as permanent  and promptly undertook
adjustment,  thereby  avoiding recourse  to borrowing in excess of their  capacity to repay.  By contrast,  those that
considered  these shocks to W-e  temporary  aberrations  and  postponed  adjustment  - continuing with normal  levels
of expenditure  financed  by ex.ernal  borrowing - now face severe payment  difficulties as the borrowed  resources
were used  mainly for consumption.  Clearly, countries must be prepared  to react  rapidly and  sharply to negative
shocks.  Furthermore,  being less dependent  on commodity exports, Asian countries were able to better withstand
the decline  in commodity prices.
The timeliness with which countries are  able to react to these shocks and  the strength  and  adequacy of
the adjustment  seem to be a moot point.  Those  countries which take early remedial action  are  eventually better
6JA'i  th4U  tl  i A  90  W -- ;104  :AJ't-6  :1-  lproractcd  isnacto,,..  and  11vv  ;iJi:  W;b;3L'  Ul  'tAlt  0  gOt;  kgglaVatou.
Malaysia recognized  the gravity of the  international  economic  environment  early on  in the  1981-1982
period  and  took corrective  measures  to turn around  both  the fiscal deficit and  the  current  account  deficits very
significantly. Indonesia, becoming  aware of the softening in oil markets, started the process of drastic adjustment
in  1983 to help  restore  the  competitiveness  of non-oil  exports.  Korea  decided  to retrench  its ambitious  heavy
ilUusLIy  CApalIbiUll  plUgrani  WeCn  it  lealiia;  that ihe economy was in serious troubie.
9Edwards,  S. (1990)  'Operness,  Outward  Orientation,  Trade  Liberalization  and Econonmic  Performance in developing
countries.'  (World  Bank  PRE  Working Paper  191;.
l°Mieko  Nishimizu  and Sherman  Robinson,  'Trade  Policies and  Productivity Change  in semi-industrialized  countries.'
Joumal  of Development  Economics,  (September  - October  1984)7
Seiji  Nayu,"  a  former  Cliief Economist  of  ADB  has  made  a  quantitative  estimate  of  the  balance  of
payments  effects  of  external  shocks  and  the  policy  response  of  12 Asian  developing  countries  in  making
adjustment  to  these  shocks.  He  estimated  that  the  ten  net  oil  importers  had  adverse  effects  averaging  17.5
percent  of GNP  between  1974 and  1982.  The more  open  economies are  more  vulnerable  to open  shocks and
thici the effet!r  !z"2  ger in  iiw  s*;en  i'us  the more open countnes  and  smaller for larger  or relatively
closed economies.  Indonesia  and  Malaysia had  favorable effects.
The balance of payments  effects can arise either  due  to terms  of trade  losses which reflect  in part  the
large increases in oil prices and the export volume effects which reflect the impact of the various recessions.  In
this study, three-fourths  to four-fifths  of the effects was due  to terms  of trade  losses.
Adjustments are  usually analyzed in terms of expenditure  reduction,  expenditure  switching or  financing.
Naya argues  that  adjustments  to  these external  shocks  can take place through  four different  mechanisms:  (a)
increase  in export market  share  (b)  import  substitution  (c)  import  savings via lower economic  growth  (d) net
external borrowing.  He  uses this typology to analyze the outcome.
It was found  that the newly industrialized  ec.l-oiiies  (NIEs)  relied mainly on increased  export market
penetration  and  secondarily  on  import  savings and  import  substitution.  The  Southeast  Asian  oil importers
increased  their  export  market  shares  but  also relied  on  recourse  to net  external  finance.  The  South  Asian
countries and  the Philippines  overwhelmingly opted  for external borrowing while the South Asian countries took
measures  to reduce  spending  initially, but  later expanded  external  borrowing.
The  nature  of  thle policy  responses  has  important  implications  for  the  problems  of  extemal  debt,
particularly  in the Philippines.  It may be useful  to recount  the experience  of the Philippines  here  - one of the
two severely indebted  countries  in Asia. 12
'The Philippine  crisis resulted  from  both  exttrnal  and  internal  causes.  External  conditions  created  a
difficult situation but inappropria:e  government domestic and macroeconomic policies turned difficulty into crisis.
After a decade of rapid growth, the Philippines faced problems  of long-term  structural  adjustment  and short-term
stabilization.  The  long-tern  problem  was to shift the economy  to a  more open  outward-looking  stance.  The
old import substitution could no longer be paid for by taxing exports of primary products;  the Philippines needed
to promote  exports  of labor-intensive  manufactured  goods to achieve sustained  economic  development.  This,
in turn,  required  liberalization  of foreign trade,  including relaxation  of trade  restrictions  and  lessening of tariff
rates  and  their  dispersion.  However,  before  structural  changes  could  take  place,  the  external  environment
4Cuue  wurbc.  Tne government  began relying more and more on capital market  borrowings to cover the saving
and foreign exchange gaps.  Fiscal deficits mounted and the current  account deficit rose in the late  1970s. Rather
than  cutting expenditures  and  thus sacrificing some growth  in order  to stabilize  the economy,  the  government
in the  early 1980s gambled  that export growth  would pick up.  Between  1980 and  1982, the  budget deficit in the
Philippines  rose from  1.3% of GDP  to 4.2%; the current  account deficit rose  from 5.8% to 8%.  Expansionary
fiscal policies were  financed by extemal  borrowing.  The  Philippine peso  anpreciated  in re-Al  tprme  Qtvaint  th
currencies  of major  trading  partners,  lessening  the competitiveness  of exports  and  increasing  the  incentives to
import.  The government  increased  investment  in poorly managed  state  enterprises.  In  the  meantime,  capital
flight reachec  alarming  proportions;  domestic  savings was  discouraged  by  low  real  interest  rates  and  the
overvalued  peso.
11  S. Naya.  'Effects  of Extemal  Shocks on the  Balance of Payments  Policy responses  and  debt problens  of Asian Developing
Countries."  (ADB  Economics  Office Repot  No. 22, December  1983).
12The following account  is reproduced  from James et al (1987),  Asian Development,  (San Francisco,  International  Center  for
Econornic  Growth).8
In response to the worsening  externat and internal deficits, the Philippine government reversed trade
liberalization  policies  and restricted imports  rather than abandoning  its i..appropriate speniing and exchange  rate
policies. Subsequently,  witb exports falling  and access to additional external finance dwindling,  the government
was forced to seek a rescheAduling  of its huge external debt in 1983.
The growth rate o' the Philippine  economy  declined steadily  after i978 despite the government's  efforts
to prop it up.  The growth thti was attained under the mlismanaged  macroecono-ic policies proved to be short-
lived  and expensive. Real GNP declined by over 5  % in 1986  and 3  % in 1985,and  per capita income in 1990was
still below the 1980  level."
A contrasting example is that of India during the same period.  '3  The oil price increases worsened
India's vulnerable external accounts  and exacerbated  inflation. Although  the economy  was already in recession,
the govemment decided against borrowing abroad to absorb this new shock.  Instead, domestic savings  were
boosted from 14  percent of GDP in 1965-72  to 19  percent in 1973-78  by raising  taxes and interest rates, reducing
public spending,  and tightening monetary policy. Domestic energy prices were also raised quickly to the new
international levels. By 1978,  India had a small trade and current account surplus, a comparatively  low  debt to
GDP ratio and large foreign  reserves. Despite the second  oil price increase, India's growth rate during 1979-84
averaged 5.1 percent a year, compared with 3.6 percent a year in  1950-79. India, however, expanded its
borrowing abroad  - both commercial and short term- in the later half of the 1980s to finance its growing
budgetary deficits.
The nature of the adjustment prices followed  by the highly  indebted countries in Latin America  has been
documented elsewhere.  '4  Tn  Brazil, the import substitution policy  was supplemented with a heavy relia -e on
foreign  borrowing to finance major investment  projects. In Mexico,  the populist policies that led to spectacular
growth in the public  sector and in the fiscal  deficits lay behind the crisis. In Chile,  the opening up of the Chilean
economy allowed the private sector to  finance huge increases in consumption - especially durables - with
borrowing  from abroad.
(3)  Macroeconomic  Policies"
Third, the countries in the Asia region,  by and large followed  relatively  cautious  macroeconomic  policies
in the 1970s  and 1980s,  thereby avoiding  inflation. The kind of policies  that were pursued by the successful  East
Asian countries present a sharp contrast to those followed by the Latin American countries.  South Asian
countries had, until recently, followed  prudent macroeconomic  policies but their recent policy  performance has
raised senous questions.  I  he aifference in the case of South Asian  countries iies more in ineir inward-oriente
regime rather than the set of macroeconomic  policies in the later half of the 1970s  and early 1980s.
The Chinese case is quite different and mixed. External borrowing has not been a major issue so far.
The development performance has been impressive,  but the unfinished reform agenda is long.  Over the last
decade, China's GDP growth has averaged 9.5 percent per annum.  Investment was high throughout and  was
matched by a  strong savings performance, which contained the  need  for external borrowtng.  Industrnal
modernization increased  the  competitiveness of  China's  manufactures in  the  international market  and
merchandise  exports grew from $18.3billion  in 1980  to $52.5billion  in 1989. China's share of international trade
rose from 0.97 percent to 1.7 percent during the same period.  The average incomes of the 800  million rural
1
3World  Development  Report  1985, Box. 4.2
1
4Edwards,  S. 'Structural  Adjustment  Policies  in Highly Indebted  Countries.'  (UCLA  Working Paper  453,September  1987).
1
5 The discussion  in the following paragraphs  on the macroeconomic  policies of East  Asian countries  draws heavily upon  F.
Larrain  and R.  Vergara  (1991),  'Investment  and  Macroeconomic  Adjustment:  The case of Asia.  (mimeo,  The World  Bank).9
population more than doubled and absolute poverty  receded nationwide.
Thie  most significant  issue in China, however,  is the alleged  conf'ct between reform and macroeconomic
stability.  The decentralization  of decision making and reliance on market mechanisms for price formation and
allocation of resources are believed to thwart the attempts to eliminate the macroeconomic disequilibria that
generate inflationary  pressures.  Balassa (1982)  '6has argued, however,  that readjustment and reform are not
necessarily in  conflict and  may even complement each  other,  It  has  been  postulated that  important
complementarities exist between reform and  macroeconomic stability.  On the one hand, macroeconomic
stabilization  and improvement  of structural  balance  would  greatly  facilitate  the smooth implementation  of reform;
on the othe.  hand, the increases in efficiency  to be expected from refortn could ease some of the difficult
medium-term trade-offs and choices. China's debt burden is relatively  low at present and the cautious attitude
towards external borrowing showed in the last few years augers well.
(a)  Price Stabilitv
In East Asia, low  inflation  and financial  r -udence  have  been the policy  objectives  that were given  priority
over  other objectives in the  belief  that  higher rates  of inflation were associated with weaker economic
performance. That there was some validity  in this proposition can be gauged from Table 6 which shows  that low
inflation conwtries  in Asia had high domestic saving  rates, high investment rate and rapid growth in output while
the reverse was tru  in the car, of high-inflation  countries.
Even in Indonesia which witnessed high and increasing rates of inflation in the first half of the 1960s
tlv- new govemment made a strong commitment to p..ce and lower rate of inflation compared to resouice
transfers through the inflation tax. Whether this objective conflicts  with ernployment  objectives  is not obvious.
In the case of Malaysia, M. Ariff (1983)'7  has investigated the possibility  of trade off between inflation and
unemployment  and finds weak support for a traditional,  negatively  sloped  Phillips  curve. He therefore concludes
that the existence of the trade-off between inflation and unemploymen. is not bome out by the empirical
evidence. For other countries, the evidence is mixed  and ambiguous.
The variability  of inflation is also greater in countries with high inflation rates.  Most countries in Asia
recorded low  variability  except  the Philippines  where both the variability  and the average inflation  rate have been
high during the 1980-90  period.
Malaysia,  Thailand,  China, Pakistan,  India, Korea and Indonesia recorded average  annual inflation rates
in einole digite dfiri-g  the period and also showed  low  variability. Banglades.h  ar.d Sti  LAinka  'Had  inflation rates
exceedir7 10  percent with low and moderate variability  respectively. In contrast GDP output deflator in Brazil
record,d an annual average increase of 165  percent, Argentina 298 percent and Mexico 68 percent d4ring the
1980-87perio..  The variability  was also quite high in these countries.
(b)  Monetary and Credit  Policies
There exists  persuasive  evidence to support the proposition  that positive  real rate of interest encourages
allocation of resources to their best and highest return use under a comnparative  financial  market structure. In
the absence of positive real rates, credit has to be rationed by factors other than price. Under these conditions
it has been suggested that somewhere between one thitd and two-thirds  of total investment will be wasted, in
16 aassa  B. 'Economic reform in China,' Banca Nazionale  del Lavoro, September 1982.
1 7Ariff, M. (1983), 'Inflation in Malaysia  - an empirical  enquiry,' in Proceeding to a Conference on Inflation  in East Asian
Countries, Chung-Ha Institute for Econom;c  Research, Taipei.10
the sense of yielding  less than its potential.  18  In the East Asian countries, real interest rates were positive and
moderately high in the 1980s. (See Table 7)
Thus, although investment  was  not strictly  allocated  by the market in many instances,  private companies
using the funds had to pay positive real rates. Credit was not flagrantly  subsidized,  but it was directed. To some
extent, demand for credit had been limited by price, but still credit availability  increased s:gnificantly,  e.g. from
10.7% of GDP in 1965 to 56.1% in 1987  in Korea, from 14% to 46 % in Thailand and from 13% to 62% in
Malaysia. In Indonesia, domestic credit grew at an average 21 % per year between 1973-81,  but the inflation
trend was much subdued.
The growth of the formal financial sector in these economies is reflae-ed in the extent of "financial
deepening' defined as the growth in the share of financial  assets in the economy. The ratio of M2 to GDP ( a
measure of financial  deepening) has risen in all these countries. In Korea it has gone from 11.7% in 1962-65
to 39% in 1985-88;  in Thailand from 23.9% to 62.9% and in Malaysia  from 27.3% to almost 70% over the same
period and in Indonesia from 12.9%  to 35% in 1989.
Indeed, maintaining  moderately  high real interest rates appears to be closely  associated with economic
performance  and financial  deepening at the intemational level. Empirical evidence indicates  that countries that
have maintained relatively  high real interest rates have performed better by a considerable margin than those
who have favored negative red  interest rates. 19
(c)  Fiscal Policy
Expansionary  fiscal policies have been the bane of the debt problem in many developing countries.
Ninety percent of long  term debt of developing  countries has either been directly  contracted by the Government
or guaranteed by it.  Therefore, the Government's debt servicing  capacity  and thus its fiscal  position assumes a
critical  role.  The ratio of Government  debt to GNP will  fall if the non-interest government  surplus,  as a percent
of the debt, exceeds the difference between the interest rate and the growth rate of real GNP.  X  Since many
of the highly indebted countries were unable to meet this condition, they had difficulties  in making their debt
service obligations.  On the other hand, NIEs and Asian countries have had, in general, very responsible fiscal
policies (except the Philippines). Public savings  have been positive  every single year since 1970,  and the budget
deficit,  which includes  public investment as an outlay, has never reached worrisome proportions.  A moderate
fiscal  expansion  has been used only for very short periods of time, to produce a reactivation  when internal and
external conditions  were not favorable. Moreover,  when  budget deficits  have  increased, governments  have shown
a remarkable ability to bring them down quickly,  so that they do not jeopardize macroeconomic stability.
In Thailand, fiscal deficits  have been around 4% of GDP for several years during the 1980s. The Bank
of Thailand,  thjugh, has been careful to avoid monetary  financing  as much as possible. Malaysia  has experienced
even  higher public  deficits  but the Government  has carefully  avoided  resorting to monetary  financing  and deficits
have been reduced significantly  since 1987. Indonesia  has averaged deficits up to 5% of GDP but has contained
them to 2% in recent years. The deficits were financed mainly  through counterpart funds generated by foreign
aid and external project assistance.
le Polak, J. J., Financial Policies and Develooment  (Paris: OECD, 1989).
'9McKinnon,  R. (1989), "Financial  Liberalization  and Economic  Develooment: A Reassessment  of Interest Rate Policies in
Asia and Latin  .metica."  International Center for Economic  Growth, ICS Press, San Francisco.
) Blanchard  et al,  The Sustainability  of Fiscal Policy:  New Answers  to Old Questions,' Economic  Studies. Vol. 15 (Paris,
OECD).1]
It noeod  to he  stressed  thlat in cotintriic  \A,lbh  rolalivl)  high doniesiic  rates  of  savings,  public  sector
deficits of the  nmagnitude  Jisplay ed in Thailainld  ant] NMfal.tsia  lealve enoutghl  space for the private  sector  withouit
creating  inflationary pressures.
(d)  Exchange Rate Policy
Overvalued exclhange  rates have been a common occurrence  in a majority of Latin American and African
countries  rcsulting  in losses in pr<duction  and  external  competitiveness.  The cornerstone  of the exchange  rate
policy  in  Korea,  Thailand,  Malavsia  and  Indlonesia,  on  the  other  hand,  has  been  to  maintain  external
competitiveness.
Since  1980,  Korea  has  followed  a  system  of  gradual  adjustments  to  the  nomir,al  exchange  rate.
determined  with respect  to a basket of  countries.  Aftcr  periods  of real  appreciation  or  extemal  difficulties, a
one  shot devaluation  has hben  used to restore  competitiveness  of exports.  In Thailand,  the  exchanige rate  has
been  pegged  to the dollar  for three  decades, with two devaluations:  10% in 1981 and  14% in 1984.  There  was
also a period of floating rates between  1979 and  1981. In general,  low inflation has allowed the preservation  of
a  relatively high real  exchange  rate,  and  after  periods  of mild  appreciation,  devaluationc  have  been  used  to
restore  competitiveness.
Real exchange rate depreciation  in Indonesia in 1983 (28'%) and  1986 (31  97),  and the flexibilityachieved
through  an actively managed  float subsequently  have played a key role in boosting non-oil exports and  reducing
the  current  ac_ount deficit.
Malaysia has  kept a stable  and convertible  currency.  The real exchange rate  has remained  very stable
over the  last two decades.  Only in recent  years has  the currency  appreciated  by a  significant amount.  Large
inflows of  foreign  investment,  which  have  pushed  up  intemational  reserves,  are  mostly  responsible  for  this
appreciation  of the  ringitt.
(e)  Industrial and Trade Policies
The  thrust  of  the  trade  and  industrial  policies  in  the  ASEAN-4  and  NIEs  has  centered  around
enhancement  of  domestic  competition  and  promilotion of  exportables  through  the  maintenance  of  realistic
exchange rates, enhancement  of import competition  through  lower tariffs and the reduction of non-tariff barriers,
removin.  msArket-(liqlorting  rectrictions  like  nrice  controls  :nd  -,qcino  vmr1imm  ki.n,d  of  rpmdatinnc  Ae  2a  1f
manufacturing  value added,  on average, grew inore than  four times as fast in the NIEs and  ASEAN4  (over  10
percent)  as  in  Latin  America,  andr more  than  three  times  as  fast  as  in  Africa  between  1973 and  s988.
Manufactured  exports  led  the high growth  of the industrial  sectors  in these countries.
In general,  industrial policies in NIEs and  ASEAN-4 have placed greater  reliance on the private sector
nhe,  n-icr  -- ir.'-,  ff  n.iw  fived  inve,tmnent  The  r.ile of  the  g...  !  1:,'F  I  ee  I  ra-ua!-  red.cedI,hrough
privatization  of  existing  state  enterprises.  Many  kinds  of  investment  incentives  have  been  used  in  this
attempt.
Korea  haz widely uised import  restrict'lnv.  rarticulan  -:!ng  the  industrialization  stage of  the  1970s.
Although  tariffs  have  not  heen  high,:'  quantitative  tradc  rs:li  .:nons  have  implied  a  high  degree  of  protection
frd  lorne.qjz  in.dtntrie.  The  idTea hac  hben  to}  nurtire  somill  infant  indoUtries,  so  that  they  can  eventually
grow  tipl  and be(ome  competitive  in xworld  markets.  Thiis  trIatey,  whichi worked  so badly  in Latin  America,  has
21F.r  oxamn,  t,  tl,,c  :mirl - 1,  sesr,jr  t,wlr  r.!c  fI  *  IQ  9  .3  \k;<'  i,van,  23.  . 11 47.  p 3?,  ji'  id)12
prodi. cd  positive rezuhs in sp. CiI'  imsitin. s  su.-'  - ,t  ni-  ,b;?.-  and  'c.-  !  -i Ni -take,  hoe%  i,  h.vc  also
Ih.el.  IliadeL.  wh1i0lh  th iiuthoritics  1'ove  1,-,'e;  0  :ui.t .'an .l  .heu 0il,', 'dhand id  t',  Pip  Paiqh  P  di;ti  osh
Export suisLdive  lsavc  bt)eei  u ed, m;ainly  .tu,in,1  preil d  .'f  p..!  lp ci;at  'o  .Jlch as  in th:  !.3t,  1970'
In tet  ,  of industrial poh  iy,  tln  f,ve  vyear  mac;  n  r  oc  plans targcted  certain  industt  i  exw  hiTh have
been  helped through  easy credit,  i..v in..nti\oc',  :UbhcZidit-,  etc.  Ffticten.y,  howe-X. had beenl Cnkour.gted  and
many of these industries  now export their-  own production  .uccessfully to the rest of the world.  The experience
of lTyundai in automrobiles has heon a  L  c-  in p.  ,nt,  al!houL1h  lal- l  it h2s  nrn  into soime difficulties in the UT.S.
niarket.
Thailand  followed  an  impoit  substitution  strategy  until  1976, with  high  tariffs  and  other  import
restrictions  so as to promote  domestic industries.  However, through the Investwment  Promotion  Act it exempted
taxes on imported  capital  machinery.  This encouraged  investment and  the  use  of modem  technologies.  The
strategy shifted towards export prom-notion  firct in 1972  and  then more strongly in 1976,  and  tariffs were reduced
substantially.  Some non-tariff  barriers  are  still significant, however.
Malaysia has kept an opcn trade  regime with very few non-tariff restrictions  and a low average tariff rate
(9.5 percent)  though  with a relatively highi disp2rsion.  According  to some  authors,  this  low protectionism  is
related  to the  belief of the  authorities  that  thc herteficiaties of piotectionism  would be  Chinese-run  business.'3
Malaysia has  made  the  most  significant progress  in privatization  with some  of the  country's  best  known  state
enterprises  being  listed on  the  local stock  exchange.  Plans  have been  draw.n to  fiurther reduce  government
ownership  of enterprises.
Industrial  policies  in Malaysia  hav'e been  an  essential  ingredient  of  the  modernization  plans  of  the
country since its independence.  Fiscal and other  broad  incentives to industrial  investment have been provided
throughout.  As a result, the manufacturing  sector has  led growth in M,alaysia  during the last two decades, going
from  8.5% of GDP  in 1961 to more than  20  %c m  I  he  i980s.
The Indonesian Government  initiated a series of trade  reforms by reducing nominal  tariffs in 1985 and
trade  deregulation  measures  in 1985 by reducing  the  burden  of import  licensing.  The proportion  of domestic
production  protected  by import  licensing restrictions  was reduccd  from 41 % to 29% and  the value of imports
subject  to controls  declined  to 21  % from  43 %.
TI,p  hi;c  noAinst  foreipn investment was curtailed and the role of the local content program  was reduced.
In  1989 the Government  converted  the  Investment  Priority list to a short  negative list and  removed  virtually all
regulatory  constraints.  Private  firms  have been  allowed  to  establish  export  processing  zones  in authorized
industrial estates.
(fl  Poliay  Stability  and Credibilib
The role of uncertainty  in investment has been emphasized  by several authors and is generally associated
with the  irreversibility  of investment.  The basic argument  goes  as follows:  if macroeconomic  conditions  are
uncertain,  and given that once investment  is in place it is impossible to undo  it, it may pay to wait.  The greater
the  uncertainty  and  macroeconomic  instability, the  lower the  investment.
22Collins  and  Park (1989),  'External  Debt and Nlacro-conomic  Performance  in South Korea,'  in  Developing  Countr) Debt and
Economic  Performance. edited by Jeffrey  D. Sachs and Susan  Ni  Collins
23  Sec  James Ct al, (1987), ibid.1 3
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regions  of  the  wotId.  Latin  American  countries,  for  instarnIe, hax c suffered  wide  policvy  Xhanges  o\ er the  last 310
years.  la addition  to  struttuial  adl u'ptrnmiit  s.,l'ili  'liol  proeranim  have  bevn  the  notn  in  iltn  ATI!erili
throughout  the  I980s,\i%th  their  s;quel  vl  ecooI nnic  cesin  and  relative  price  volatility  Man)  countries  have
undergone  several  stabilization  etfort'.  in  the  ;hort  p,-vil  of  a  fexk years,  av in  Argentin.,  Brazi!  and  Peru  to
name  the  most  promilient.  Stabilization  progran)ms ht\i e  1I.n  few  in the  su.ccssful  .ases  of Tast  Acia.  because
they  have  rarely  been  necessar).
The  Ioo-  x'ailability  of  the  real  exchange  rate  in East  Asia  can  bte observed  in  Table  8.  The  average
coefficient  of variation  of  the  real  exchange  iate  for  the  period  1975-88in  the  four  East  Asian  countries  is 0.097;
the  same  figure  for  a sample  of  7  Latii  .Arneri,.an  countries  is more  than  twice  this,  at  0.201.  Mioreover,  the
tigtire  foi  Thailand.  tl-hc East  Asian  countr\  x\th  hi  he't  coctffictt  of  variation  (0.106),  is lower  than  the  figure
for  any  of  the  seven  Latin  Amierican  countries  in the  tabic.
Government  policies  in  East  Asia  have  by and  large  been  credible  and  consistent  with  emphasis  on
promoting  exports,  savings  and  investment,  and  on  the  mindatrialization  of  the  economr..  Investors  inside  and
outside  these  countnies  have  perceived  thcse  goals  as  pvrmanent  and  government  behavior  hab  validated  these
expectations.  This  has  produced  an  extraordinarily  good  environment  for  investment,  vwitnessed  b)' ver)  high
private  investment  rates.  The  absence  of  major  pol;cy  changes  over  the  last  three  decades,  as  mentioned  above,
has  no  doubt  enhanced  credibility.
(g)  Income  Dist-ibution
It  has  been  argued  that  one  of  the  reasonis  that  latin  American  governments  have  been  so erratic  in
their  macroeconomic  policies  may  be  the  big  inconie  inequality  existing  in these  countries.  24  Income  inequality
leads  to social  pressures  that  governments  have attempted  to relieve  through  populist  policies.  After  one  or  two
years  of economic  expansion  inflatior,  soars,  real  xvages fall, unemployment  starts  to increase  and  output  declines.
The  policies  prove  to  be  unsustainable  and  the  goverarnent  has to switch  to another  set of policies.  The  populist
cycle has  been suffered  by many countries  in the region.  s  .o..  . . .
In  East  Asia  the  situation  is just  the  opposite.  Indeed,  macroeconomic  stabiliLy  is  facilitated  by
equitable  income  distribution.  The  inlcome  distribution  figures  for  a group  of  East  Asian  and  Latin  American
countries  (the  share  in national  income  of  the  top  and  the  bottom  quantiles  of  the  income  distribution),  show
the  tatio  of  top  to bottom  income  is much  lower  for East  Asian  countries  than  for Latin  American  ones.  In  East
.-  . '  u"m'  "''""  _A-''--+  A"AIb"'-A+  JIA'  . t  U.  l  01as,  on a.C  j)UOi  C.i;  ;.W  poul  vi  IO  11CiCiwIL.
In  Iatin  America,  the  ratio  is  18.6 times  (see  Tahle  9).  Moreover,  with  the  exception  of  Malaysia,  the
distribution  of  income  in East  Asia  is within  the  range  shown  by developed  economies.  Furthermore,  even  in
Malaysia  the progress  has been  impressive.  The  incideince of  poverty  in Malaysia  has declined  by 34.4percentage
points  between  1973 and  1987.  The  income  difterential  between  the  Chinese  and  Malays  has  been  greatly
reduced.  In  1973,a  Chinese  had  a 26 percent  less  chance  of being  poorer  than  a  Malay,  holding  other  variables
constant.  By  1987, the  differential  had  been  reduced  to  7 percent.
La4Iz"iii  and Vcrgara,  ibid.14
Recent  work  has  suggeNted  that  incomn  inequality  provokes  aI negativc  effect  ofn econonhjic  growth7(Vtn
It has betn  postulated  that a key channel tor thi  rviatiuoi hip  iv  investmernt. More eAluitable  inconle diqtribution
leads  to less  social conflict,  which reduces  uncertainty  and  creates  a  more  stable  econornic  environment  for
investment.
(4)  Capital  Flows and  Portfolio  Management
Fourth,  the  Asian  countries  made  productive  use  of  borrowed  external  funds,  eased  infrastructure
bottlenecks,  inivested in human  resources,  expanded  productive base, and did not allow public sector enterprises
to run nmassive  deficits.  They ensuied  that the growth of exports  and income  exceed the growth  of debt and  the
interest  rate.  It is only when the  interest  rate  exceeds the growth rate  of both GDP  and exports, debt  and  debt
ratios grow on an explosive and  unsustainable  path.  The external  capital flows were  not very large  in relation
to  debt  servicing capacity and  were  diversified over time,  with foreign diret  investment  becoming  a  growing
vehicle for raising extemal  finance.  The volumc, terms aind conditions of borrowing from private and commercial
sources were also carefully worked out to avoid a mismatch between  beniefits stream and the repayment  of debt.
lThe success of their external  borroswing  strategy can be gauged from the  fact that four Asian econonies
have begun  to make large  net resource  transf'ers abroad.  These  transfers  are  different  from  those made  by the
highly indebted  countries  as they were made  in the context of high GDP  per capita growth, high investment and
current  account  surpluses.  Korea  has  maintained  its  investment  at  30 percent  of  GDP  but  also  made  net
resourrce transfers  of  8 percent  of GDP.
One  way of  measuring  the  efficiency of  capital invested  is examining  the  incremental  capital  output
ratios.  Table  10 presents  ICORs  for five East Asian countries and  reveals that these countries have ueen quite
efficient  in terms  of  their  investment.  ICORs  in  these economies  are  within the  range  shown  by the  most
efficient countries.  The sharp  and short-lived  increase  in Mialaysia's figures during  the mid-1980s is associated
with the  1985-86 recession;  iCORs  of subsequent  years show a marked  improvement.  This outcome  is closely
linked to the  trade  and  industry policy stances  of these  countries which have been  discussed  earlier.
Recent  empirical  work on the  sources  of growth  of income  carried  out by the  Bank provides  further
corroborative  evidence  for efficiency of resource  use, going beyond capital  alone. 2'  Table  11 decomposes  the
source  of GDP  growth  by the relative  contributions  of capital,  labor and  total factor  productivit)  (TFP).  TFP
captures  the  efficiency with which  inputs  are  used.  For  the  period  1960 -73, the  differences  in the  relative
cointributions  ot  capitai  aind  [oJi  jUL  E.h  . ,  d  L;..  A....  i0  nt  '  "qi'  lr  b,,  hitt  for the
subsequent  period  1973-87,TFP accounted  for one-fitth  of the growth in East  Asia while its contribution  in both
Africa and  Latin America  was strongl)  ne-ative.  This study also found a strong and positive association between
productivity growth and aggregate  growth.  The decline in Latin America  GDP  growth  in 1973-87 relative to the
earlier  period  is closely matched  with the  decline in TFP.
Asian  countries  not  only  invested  the  horro.xncd  resources  productively  but  had  a balanced  portfolio  of
foreign  capital  flows.  ASEAN-4  and  China  relied  heavily  on  Foreign  Direct  Investment  flows  in addition  to
horrowing  from  commercial  sources,  bilateral  and  multilateral  inctitutions  at  competitive  rates.  ASEAN-4  and
China  made  sensible  decisions  in  rclation  to  external  borrowvinv  about  (a)  the  terms  of  foreign  borrowing  -
interest,  maturity  and  cash  flow profiles  (h)  the  currencis  in \xhich  liabilities  a.-,  determined  (c)  the  balance
betwcen  fixed  rate  and  floating-  rate  intrunments:  (d)  Xays  of  sharing  risk  between  lenders  and  borrowe;rs,
including  the balanLe  betwcen  debt  anjd equity  and  (e)  the  IL%- and  comnpo.sit;n  of a  country's  reser\es.  The
Alksina L,nd  Rodrk  (1991), "Diqifibt;t:\  PlRi.-  and E,onmIk, Gio,\kh,  NBER %orkini  pzpdr  '  3668
(Th,; W\uld  i  anik.  \NoiIJ D;7l-p'n;i:X!  R; 'tr.  I-: \x *,iygi,r DC) X15
maturity structure, interest rate and currency  composition  were compatible with the repayment capacity  of  the
projects or investments  for which  the funds were borrowed. The level  and composition  of the reserves were both
adequate.  Of course, there were exceptions  to these generalizations  in individual  country  cases at certain points
of time. Indonesia's growing  exposure  in yen was a source of concern  in 1987  and 1988  while the size of Korea's
debt stock in 1982  had created some questions in the minds of the creditors.
South  Asian countries received  substantially  large  proportions  of capital flows  in the form of concessional
assistance.  It is only in the late 1980s that India became a significant borrower in the international capital
markets.  Finally, the share of variable interest rates in total debt wab *.omparaiiveiy  lower than the Latm
American countries and thus the rise in interest rates did not result in immediate servicing  difficulties.
FDI has contributed to growth both by augmenting resources available for capital formation and by
improving  the efficiency  of investment. The rate of approval  of FDI in ASEAN  countries during the period 1986-
89 is impressive. According to some estimates, the total approvals  escalated to $16.7 billion  in 1989  compared
to $2.5  billion in 1986. FDI flows account for more than 50% of all types of capital flows to these countries.
In China, the pledged value of foreign direct investment amounted to $34 billion at the end of 1989,  of which
$15.4billion  had actually  been disbursed. Disbursements  have risen to $3.3 billion  annually and foreign  investors
have  made  a  major  contribution to  the  development of  services, oil  exploration and  export-oriented
manufacturing industries.  As a  result, these countries do not face difficulty in attracting foreign savings at
relatively  lower cost.
(5)  Domestic  Savings
Finally the domestic savings  rates and domestic resource mobilization  efforts in these countries were
intense which enabled them  to finance a  large proportion of their overall investment without resorting to
excessive  external borrowing.
For the period 1973-80,  Asia's domestic savings  rate was 25.3 % while investment ratio was 26.1 %. In
the subsequent  period 1980-87  these ratios were 26.7% and 28.1 %  respectively. Foreign resources inflows  were
thus modest despite the two oil shocks and other adverse external circumstances. Empirical studies have also
shown a stronger correlation between growth rates in GDP and domestic savings ratios than between growth
rates  and  investment rates.  Thus  the policy relevance of stronger domestic saving effort becomes more
pronounced.
When domestic  savings  decline in relation to national income while external indebtedness increases,  the
substitution of external borrowing  for domestic savings  implies a rise of funds borrowed from abroad to finance
consumption. The evidence for Asia shows that this has not happened.
The saving  rates of China and Malaysia  exceeded  35 % while  those of Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Thailand,  and
MrD  a,_  30  ZOV. '-dia  saves aboui 21  %o  of its income.  In thalland, significant  increases in government
savings  have taken place. The Philippines,  Pakistan and Sri Lanka have lower domestic  savings  rates in the range
of 10 to 15 percent while Bangladesh has barely positive rates.  The savings  GDP ratio in Latin America was
20% and Sub-Saharan Africa about 13%.
Fry'  has analyzed determinants of savings  ratios in Asian developing  economies and found that these
ratios are increased by income growth. National savings  ratios are also raised by a higher overall  governnent
budget balance aid by higher real deposit rates of interest. On the other hand, higher population dependency
27Fry, M.J.,  Domestic  Resource Mobilization  in Developing  Asia: Four Policy Issues.'  Asian Development  Review 1991,
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ratios, expansionary  monetary policy and  higher foreign deb. reduce savings.  As pointed  out earlier,  East Asian
countries  had  higher  real  rates  of  interest,  relatively  lower  budgetary  deficits  and  tight  monetary  policies
throughout  this period  with some exceptions and  interruptions.
In recent  years, however, the growing government  hudgetary deficits in India and  Pakistan have created
pressures  on the  sustainability of their  creditworthiness.  Interest  payments  on internal  and external  borrowing
are growing rapidly and accounted  for 30 % of current  expenditure  in Pakistan  and 25 % in India.  The domestic
resource  gap is bigger than the current  account  deficit as rernittances  from workers  abroad  are  substantial.  But
the recent  Gulf Crisis exposed the vulnerability of these countries  to reliance on this source of foreign exchange.
The heavily indebted  countries of Latin America  got into trouble precisely because of large public sector deficits
which were  financed through  monetary expansion and large borrowing.  The South Asian countries should learn
from  the  lessons of the  HICs  and take steps  to contain  their  fiscal imbalances.  But  they must also ensure  that
fiscal contraction  does not reduce  investment in social sectors and  that demand  management  is accompanied  by
structural  reforms,  particularly  in incentive policies.
CONCLUSIONS
The  case of  Asian developing  countries  in managing  their  foreign debt  burden  presents  a  contrast  to
Latin American  and  African countries. '  For the latter group, the combination  of inward-oriented  strategy, poor
quality of macroeconomic  policies and investment  in unproductive  ventures contributed  a great deal towards the
final outcome.  A study of the twelve highly indebted  countries carried  out by the World Bank in the mid-1980s,
concluded  that  the quality of economic management  in these countries  themselves was the decisive determinant
leading  them  towards  the path  of debt  crisis.
The  Asian  countries,  with  a  few exceptions,  pursued  an  outward-oriented  strategy,  and  prudent
macroeconomic  policies.  They made  quick adjustment  to external  shocks by expenditure  switching, expanding
exports  and curtail;ng consumption.  Most of the borrowed  and  locally raised funds were invested in productive
uses  that  raised  the  capacity  of  the  economy  to repay  the  debt.  These  countries  relied  heavily on  domestic
savings and  domestic  resources  for financing investment.
It  would be  misleading  to  suggest that  the  Asian  countries  did not  have  their  crisis  periods  - either
induced  by domestic  policy slippages  or extemal  shocks.  Korea  met a  serious  crisis in  1980.  Indonesia  faced
difficult problems  when oil prices  fell in  1983.  Malaysia was confronted  with a  current  account  deficit of  14
percent  of GNP in 1982.  But the important  point to note  is that in each case adequate,  strong, and  timely policy
1CGFV1v,0  tV"Z4,,IJ  LiC  The.a:c.  ..  cr.ise's  otr  t.  A  4  *  r  g  agra  At  -iSA  "  v  a
whole  period  of two decades  is examined,  the  end-results  appear  impressive as presented  in this paper.
In the  Latin American  countries,  the  governments expanded  external  borrowing  to offset the effects of
extemal  shocks.  In Brazil,  it led  to  substitution  for domestic  savings by foreign  resources  to  support  import
substitution  strategy  and  in Mexico fiscal deficits were  financed  by external  borrowing.
At the same time, the domestic residents  of these countries  transferred  billions of dollars abroad.  Why
did capital flight occur  on such a massive scale?  The answer  has much to do with fiscal, monetary  and  balance
of payments  management,  and in particular  with the maintenance  of overvalued exchanee  rates and unattractive
interest  rates intended  to curb inflation.  Overvalued exchange rates and uncompetitive  interest  rates have clearly
been  shown  to  encourage  capital  flight.  Tn  the  longer  run,  distorted  exchange  and  interest  rates  erode
2sThe  references  in  Latin American  and  African countries  in this  study pertain  to  the  period  prior to  1987.  Since 1987,Chile,
Mexico and Venezuela  have undertaken  successful economic  reforms  and achieved  significant progress.  Argentina,  Peru  and Brazil
have also  initiated  some  reforms, but  it is too  early  to judge  the  resulu  Similarly, more than  twenty  African countries  are  currently
pursuing  structural  adjustment  programs  and the  preliminary  results are  encouraging17
creditworthiness  because of their  depressing  effect on exports  and  savings.
Again, in countries where  funds were borrowed  specifically for investment purposes  and in fact invested
rather  than  consumed,  much  of  the  investment  yielded  low  or  negative  economic  returns.  These  poor
investments,  however  attractive  the  termsq  of borrow.ing, b  a.m  a ,jor  probLkri as they failed to geneiate  an
income  stream  to service debt  and  depressed  the  efficiency of the economy as a whole.
Countries  such  as Argentina,  Mexico and  Venezuela  which experienced  massive private  capital  flight
while they were  stepping  up external  borrowing  courted  servicing trouble,  since much  of the borrowed  money
was clearly not  invested  in high  return  projects.  As a  result,  these  countries  were  faced  with debt  payment
obligations, the income counterpart  of which was out of the governments'  reach.  The return  of flight capital has
started  in Mexico and  Venezuela  - both of which have embarked  on successful economic  reforms  since  1987.
In the ASEAN-4,  China, India and  Korea, the investment rates were relatively high, financed mostly out
of domestic  savings and  the  foreign borrowing  was used judiciously  and  widely as a  complement  to domestic
savings.  Foreign  capital  did not  account  for more  than  2 to  3 percent  of  GDP  in these  countries  while  the
investment  rates were  on an  average 30 percent  of GDP.
Particular  attention  was paid to price stability which reduced the uncertainty  and strengthened  investor
confidence.  Tight  monetary  and  fiscal policies  along  with  flexible exchange  rate  management  maintained
external  competitiveness.  Industrial  and  trade  policies  induced  private  investment,  promoted  manufacturing
sector and manufactured  exports and reduced price distortions.  Policy continuity helped to strengthen  credibility
and Rtability ..hile equitab'e  ixz,or,e  Iitz ibLuiuii  xiciiuicd  c.redibiiity  by minimizing social and political tensions.
The  lessons  that  can  be  drawn  from  this  comparative  study  of highly indebted  countries  and  Asian
countries  are  (a)  that  success in managing  debt  is closely related  to macroeconomic  management  as such and
(b) that  macroeconomic  stability and  prudent  economiic policies  - both  macro and  micro- stand  out at  the top
of the pyramid of the factors that influence external  debt outcomes  of developing countries.  If these policies are
generally  sound, sporadic episodes of overborrowing  or inadequate  attention  to the terms, maturity and currency
composition  of external  debt would tend not to make a large difference.  But if the basic policies are inadequate
then such acts of indiscretion  in external  debt  management  tend  to get magnified and  create  serious  difficulties
for  the  debtor  countries.  The  recent  upturn  in Latin  American  countries,  particularly  in Chile,  Mexico and
Venezuela,  which  are  now pursuing  successful  macroeconomic  adjustment,  tends  to  provide  support  for the
validity of these lessons.18
Table  1.  Average  Annual  Growth  Rate of Long-Term  Debt
1973-80  1980-87
East  Asia  22.7  12.7
South  Asia  11.2  13.4
Latin  America  21.6  9.1
Sources:  World  Bank,  World  Debt  Tables,1990.
Table  2.  Comparative  Debt Indicators  1980-90
Asia  Latin  America
1980  1990  1980  1990
Debt/GNP  19  25  35  48
Debt/Exports  108  108  197  261
Debt Service/Exports  15  15  37  33
Interest/Exports  9  7  20  17
Source: World  Bank data.19
Table  3.  Economic  Performance  Indicators
1965-73  1973-80  1980-87
Asia  LAC  Asia  [AC  Asia  LAC
Growth  of GDP  5.3  5.8  5.6  5.0  6.8  1.5
GDP  output  deflator  1.8  3.5  6.8  15.9  6.1  39.8
Growth  of Merchandise  Export  7.1  -0.4  8.5  2.2  9.0  3.4
Growth  of Investment  7.8  7.1  8.7  5.4  7.9  -4.0
Growth  of Per  Capita  Consumption  2.1  2.9  3.2  2.9  3.8  -0.7
Current  Account  Balance  /  GDP  -2.0  -2.6  -6.3  -3.1  -2.0  -2.7
Share  of Manufacturing
in  Exports  29.4  10.9  37.5  17.7  50.2  23.8
Source: World  Bank data.20
Table  4:  Human  Development  Indicators  for  Asia and  Latin  America
1990  199C
HDI  Rank  HDI Value
High  Human  Development  Korea  35  0.884
Chile  38  0.878
Costa  Rica  40  0.876
Argentina  43  0.854
Venezuela  44  0.848
Mexico  45  0.838
Malaysia  52  0.802
Medium  Human  Development  Panama  54  0.796
Jamaica  59  0.761
Brazil  60  0.761
Colombia  61  0.757
Thailand  66  0.713
Sri  Lanka  75  0.665
Ecuador  77  0.655
Peru  78  0.644
China  82  0.614
Philipvines  84  0.613
Nicaragua  85  0.612
Guyana  89  0.589
Low  Human  DeveloRment  Indonesia  98  0.499
Honduras  100  0.492
Bolivia  110  0.416
Pakistan  120  0.311
India  123  0.308
Bangladesh  136  0.186
Source: UNDP,  Human  Development  Report  1991.  (New  York,  Oxford  University
Press,  1991)21
Table  5:  Trade  Regime  and  Price  Distortion  Ranking  Measures
Trade  Openness  Measure,  1988  Price  Distortion  Measure,  1990
(most  open to least  open)  (least  distorted  to  most distorted)
Singapore  1  12
Hong  Kong  2  2
Malaysia  3  13
Thailand  9  6
Sri Lanka  10  1
Indonesia  11  23
Pakistan  13  7
Philippines  15  15
Bangladesh  19  3
Nepal  na  5
India  na  20
Fiji  na  19
Source:  Leamer,  Edward  (1988),  "Measures  of Openness"  in Robert  Baldwin,  ed.
Trade  Policy  Issues  and  Empirical  Analysis,  Chicago:  University  of Chicago
Press,  and  Dollar,  David,  "Outward-Oriented  Developing  Economies  Really  do
Grow  more Rapidly:  Evidence  from 95  LDCs  1976-85." mimeo.
Table  6:  Domestic  Saving,  Investment  and  GDP: 1980-90
Average  Annual  Percentages
Low Inflation  Moderate  Inflation  High Inflation
Countries 4 Countriesb  Countries'
Domestic  Saving  Rate  33.0  21.8  5.7
Investment  Rate  30.8  25.5  18.4
GDP Growth  Rate  7.2  5.1  2.7
Notes:  a - Average  annual  inflation  rate of 6  percent  or less;
b - Average  annual  inflation  rate  between  6 and  10 percent;
c  - Average  annual  inflation  rate  greater  than  10 percent.
Source: ADB,  Asian  Development  Outlook  1991.22
Table  7:  Real Interest  Rate (in  X)
1970-80 1981-88
Bangladesh  -5.7  0.1
India  -0.9  1.1
Pakistan  -3.3  1.7
Sri  Lanka  0.6  7.8
Thailand  -0.8  7.4
Malaysia  1.3  5.0
Indonesia  -0.1  6.4
Philippines  -3.0  -1.5
China  3.3  0.3
Korea  0.2  5.3
Average  of the  above  -0.8  3.4
Average  of the  HICs  -2.9  -89.9
Note:  HICs are 17  highly  indebted  countries  as defined  in the  World  Debt
Tables  1988-89.
Source: World Bank  data.23

















Source:  World Bank data.24
Table 9.  Income Distribution:  an International Comparison
Percent of National Income  Per-Capita Income (US$)
bottom 20%  top 20%  ratio
(1)  (2)  (2)/(l)  (3)
Asia
Hong Kong  5.4  47.0  8.70  9220
Indonesia  8.8  41.3  4.69  440
Korea  5.7  45.3  7.95  3600
Malaysia  4.6  51.2  11.13  1940
Singapore  5.1  48.9  9.59  9070
Taiwan  8.8  37.2  4.23  2530
Thailand  5.6  49.8  8.89  1000
Average  6.3  45.8  7.27  3971
Latin America
Argentina  4.4  50.3  11.43  2520
Brazil  2.4  62.6  26.08  2160
Chile  4.2  60.4  14.28  1510
Mexico  2.9  57.7  19.90  1760
Peru  1.9  61.0  32.11  1285
Venezuela  3.0  54.0  18.00  3250
Average  3.1  57.7  18.61  2080
Industrialized Countries
France  6.3  40.8  6.48  16090
England  5.8  39.5  6.81  12810
Italy  6.8  41.0  6.03  13330
Japan  8.7  37.5  4.31  21020
United States  4.7  41.9  8.91  19840
West Germany  6.8  38.7  5.69  18480
Average  6.5  39.9  6.14  16928
Sources:  World Bank, World Development Report (1989, 1990), Washington,
D.C., and country-specific sources.  For Chile, Instituto Nacional de
Estadisticas, September 1989.25
Table  10  Incremental  Capital  Output  Ratio
Year  Korea  Thailand  Malaysia  China  Indonesia
1971  1.47  2.25  1.78  1.97  0.96
1972  1.83  2.39  1.48  2.44  1.12
1973  1.23  1.61  1.37  1.92  1.05
1974  1.63  2.21  1.85  3.42  1.23
1975  1.80  2.04  3.14  2.01  1.59
1976  1.42  1.56  1.39  16.12  1.39
1977  1.86  1.78  1.82  2.05  1.31
1978  2.18  1.69  1.93  1.90  1.50
1979  2.65  2.23  1.69  2.63  1.72
1980  7.77  2.26  2.33  2.52  1.45
1981  2.03  2.06  2.65  2.54  2.54
1982  2.39  2.24  2.89  2.08  4.86
1983  1.84  1.88  2.80  1.96  2.11
1984  2.07  2.00  2.49  1.79  2.28
1985  2.33  2.39  5.21  2.22  3.52
1986  1.72  2.00  3.10  2.84  2.73
1987  1.85  1.61  1.96  2.53  2.77
1988  1.92  1.50  1.68  2.56  2.34
1971-88  2.22  1.98  2.31  3.08  2.03
1971-75  1.59  2.10  1.92  2.35  1.19
1976-80  3.18  1.90  1.83  5.05  1.47
1981-88  2.02  1.96  2.85  2.32  2.89
Notes:  (1)  ICOR  Investment(t)  /  [GDP(t)  - (1-d)GDP(t-l)J;
(2) d - depreciation =  0.07.
Source: World  Bank  data.26
Table  11:  Sources  of Growth
(Percentage  share  of output  growth  accounted  for  by factor  gro'wth
and total  factor  productivity)
1960-1973  1973-1987  1960-1987
Capital Labor  TFP*  Capital Labor  TFP  Capital Labor  TFP
Africa  59  22  17  92  37  -27  73  28  0
East  Asia  50  16  35  62  17  20  57  16  28
South  Asia  81  20  0  55  19  24  67  20  14
Latin  America  55  20  25  94  51  -47  67  30  0
Source:  World  Bank  Development  Report  1991 (  Table  2.3)
*  TFP:  Total  Factor  ProductivityPRE Working Paper Series
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